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LEGAL PUNISHMENT, SOCIAL DISAPPROVAL AND INTERNALIZATION AS
INHIBITORS OF ILLEGAL BEHAVIOR*
HAROLD G. GRASMICK** AND DONALD E. GREEN***
Empirical testing of the deterrence doctrine was
revived in the late 1960s with the publication of
papers by Gibbs, Tittle, and Jensen who reported
inverse relationships between the threat of legal
punishment and the volume of crime.1 The studies
by Gibbs and Tittle were based on aggregate prop-
erties of crime and punishment (Uniform Crime
Reports and National Prisoner Statistics for states
were used as the unit of analysis), whereas Jensen's
research examined individuals' perceptions of the
threat of punishment and their self-reported in-
volvement in illegal behavior. These two research
strategies-aggregate-level and individual-level
analyses-presently constitute the two major tra-
ditions in deterrence research. Economists have
conducted most of the aggregate-level research and
have concentrated both on refining measures of the
relevant variables and on adding other variables to
equations that predict crime rates. Sociologists gen-
erally have focused on individual-level analysis.
Even Tittle and Gibbs, whose earlier work with
aggregate data sparked renewed interest in deter-
rence research, recently have shifted their research
to individuals' perceptions and behavior.2
The emphasis on perceptions of punishment de-
veloped from an awareness that deterrence is a
communicative process. In order to deter, actual
threats of legal punishment must be communicated
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'Gibbs, On Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence, 49 Soc.
Sci. Q. 515 (1968); Jensen, 'Crime Doesn't Pay': Correlates
of a Shared Misunderstanding, 17 Soc. PROB. 189 (1969);
Tittle, Crime Rates and Legal Sanctions, 16 Soc. PROB. 409
(1969).2 Jensen, Erickson & Gibbs, Perceived Risk of Punishment
and Self-Reported Delinquency, 57 Soc. FORCES 57 (1978);
Tittle, Sanction Fear and the Maintenance of Social Order, 55
Soc. FoRcs 579 (1977).
to individuals. In the communication process in-
dividuals' perceptions mediate these threats before
the threats influence behavior.3 Little research has
been conducted on the relationship between actual
and perceived properties of punishment although
the evidence adduced in the three recent studies
suggests a rather low correspondence between the
two.4 Until more is known about this relationship,
many sociologists believe that research on the re-
lationship between individuals' perceptions of the
threat of sanctions, rather than the actual threat,
and their involvement in illegal behavior is the
appropriate test of deterrence theory.
Researchers using individual-level data have de-
voted the past decade to refining the measurement
of variables, perceived certainty and severity of
legal punishment, and involvement in illegal be-
havior. The two other variables considered most
frequently are the threat of social disapproval from
peers and moral commitment to the law. These
two, like the threat of legal punishment, are factors
which inhibit illegal behavior, as opposed to factors
which motivate individuals to engage in illegal acts.
The three inhibitory variables reflect the three
sociological answers to the Hobbesian problem of
order which Wrong outlined in his classic essay,
"The Oversocialized Conception of Men in Mod-
em Sociology": 5 (1) internalization of legal norms
(moral commitment), (2) fear of informal sanctions
from peers (social disapproval), and (3) fear of
physical and material deprivation from legally im-
posed formal sanctions (threat of legal punish-
3 Geerken & Gove, Deterrence: Some Theoretical Consider-
ation, 9 L. & Soc. REv. 497 (1975); Henshel & Carey,
Deviance, Deterrence, and Knowledge of Sanctions, in PEiRCEP-
TION IN CRIMINOLOGY 57-73 (R. Henshel & R. Silverman
ed. 1975).
" Cohen, Sanction Threats and Violation Behavior: An Inquiry
into Perceptual Variation, in QUANTITATIVE STUDIES IN CRIM-
INOLOGY 84-99 (C. Wellford ed. 1978); Erickson & Gibbs,
Objective and Perceptual Properties of Legal Punishment and the
Deterrence Doctrine, 25 SoC. PROB. 253 (1978); Parker &
Grasmick, The Effect of Actual Crimes and Arrests on People's
Perceptions of the Certainty of Arrest, 17 CRIMINOLOGY 366
(19.79).
'Wrong, The Oversocialized Conception of Men in Modern
Sociology, 26 AM. Soc. REv. 183 (1961).
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ment). A question occasionally raised in the deter-
rence literature is whether these variables have
simple additive effects on involvement in illegal
behavior, or whether the inhibitory effectiveness of
one depends on the level of another.
This article incorporates into a single piece of
research all previous measurement refinements and
all previous hypotheses concerning multivariate
relationships among the three inhibitory variables
and involvement in illegal behavior. After a brief
review of the measurement issues in the individual-
level deterrence research and a summary of the
current knowledge about the multivariate hy-
potheses, the authors present data which suggests
that the effects of the three inhibitory variables are
additive. The sinpple additive model accounts for
over 40 per cent of the variance in involvement in
illegal behavior, and demonstrates that each of the
three independent variables makes a significant,
independent contribution to the explained vari-
ance.
I. REFINEMENTS IN MEASUREMENT
Deterrence theory is grounded in the utilitarian
paradigm and is closely linked with both the ex-
change theory in sociology and the utility theory
in economics. It posits a model of man as a calcu-
lator of potential costs and rewards from projected
acts.6 The physical and material deprivation at-
tending legal sanctions is a potential cost of a
projected illegal act. Therefore, according to deter-
rence theory, an individual's perception of the
certainty and severity of legal punishment should
influence his decision whether to commit an illegal
act.
Unfortunately, many researchers have used mea-
sures of perceived certainty of punishment which
are poorly linked to the utilitarian premise. In
many studies where respondents have been asked
to estimate the probability of arrest for an individ-
ual committing an illegal act, researchers have
employed as frames of reference "people in gen-
eral" or "a person like yourself."7 Consistency with
the utilitarian paradigm, however, necessitates that
perceived certainty be measured by asking a re-
6 Geerken & Gove, supra note 3.
7 Anderson, Chiricos & Waldo, Formal and Informal Sanc-
tions: A Comparison of Deterrent Effects, 25 Soc. PROn. 103
(1977); Grasmick & Appleton, Legal Punishment and Social
Stigma: A Comparison of Two Deterrence Models, 58 Soc. Sci.
Q. 15 (1977); Meier &Johnson, Deterrence as Social Control:
The Legal and Extralegal Production of Conformity, 42 AM.
Soc. REV. 292 (1977); Silberman, Toward a Theory of
Criminal Deterrence, 41 AM. Soc. REV. 442 (1976).
spondent to estimate the probability that he would
be arrested if he committed the offense. This ap-
proach is a more direct measure of the respondent's
perceived potential costs than questions about the
perceived consequences of illegal behavior for
someone other than the respondent. In a recent
article, Jensen used both types of measures and
demonstrated that the respondent's perception of
the probability of arrest for himself is a much
better predictor of involvement in illegal behavior
s
This finding should serve as a guideline for future
measures of perceived certainty of punishment.
Despite measurement problems, most previous
studies report a significant inverse relationship be-
tween perceived certainty of punishment and ille-
gal behavior. Few, however, report evidence that
perceived severity of punishment is involved in the
social control process. Inconsistent with the utili-
tarian paradigm, the apparent lack of a deterrent
effect of perceived severity has cast some doubt on
the validity of its measures. The previous measures
involve asking respondents (1) to estimate the prob-
ability that they would receive some specified pen-
alty such as a jail sentence for an illegal act; (2) to
choose from a list of penalties the one they think
they would most likely receive; or (3) to estimate
the maximum penalty provided by law.
9
These measures recently have been criticized by
Erickson and Gibbs and by Grasmick and Bryjak. I°
There is no a priori reason to assume that all
individuals would consider a particular penalty
equally severe, but this assumption has been im-
plicit in previous measures. For example, two in-
dividuals might believe they would be fined $100
if arrested for an offense. One, however, might
consider this penalty trivial while the other consid-
ers it extremely costly. Under a utilitarian para-
digm, perceived severity should be measured by
the respondent subjectively determining the per-
sonal cost of the penalty expected by him. Data
presented by Grasmick and Bryjak demonstrate
that such a measure is a much better predictor of
illegal behavior than previous measures of per-
ceived severity.
An additional measurement issue is whether
8Jensen, Erickson & Gibbs, supra note 2, at 73-75.
9 See, e.g., Teevan, Subjective Perception of Deterrence, 13 J.
RESEARCH CRIME & DELINQUENCY 155 (1976); Tittle, supra
note 2; Waldo & Chiricos, Perceived Penal Sanction and Self-
Reported Criminality: A Neglected Approach to Deterrence Re-
search, 19 Soc. PROB. 522 (1972).
10 Erickson & Gibbs, On the Perceived Severity of Legal
Penalties, 70 J. CRIM. L. & C. 102 (1979); Grasmick &
Bryjak, The Deterrence Effect of Perceived Severity of Punishment
(forthcoming in Soc. FORCES).
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"perceived threat of legal punishment" is a simple
additive combination of perceived certainty and
perceived severity of punishment. There are both
theoretical and empirical reasons for suspecting
that it is not. The utilitarian paradigm implies that
perceptions of the severity of punishment if arrested
will not influence the decision to violate the law if
the actor believes that the certainty of arrest ap-
proximates zero. Regardless of the perceived sever-
ity of that form of punishment, if the actor believes
the certainty of arrest is zero, then the perceived
potential cost, in terms of legal sanctions, is zero.
Conversely, if the actor believes that the punish-
ment would be inconsequential, then the percep-
tion of the certainty of arrest will not influence
behavior. Thus, a "threat of legal punishment"
exists only when both perceived certainty and per-
ceived severity are above zero. Furthermore, it
appears that perceived certainty and perceived
severity interact. As perceived certainty increases,
the deterrent effect of perceived severity increases.
Likewise, as perceived severity increases, the deter-
rent effect of perceived certainty increases. This
type of hypothesis could be tested by the relation-
ship between involvement in illegal behavior and
the product (rather than the sum) of perceived
certainty and perceived severity." Although pre-
vious tests for an interaction effect have produced
inconsistent results, 12 only the test by Grasmick
and Bryjak utilized the preferred measures of per-
ceived certainty and perceived severity described
above. Their analysis offers strong evidence of an
interaction effect. This result suggests that per-
ceived threat of legal punishment should be oper-
ationalized as the product of properly measured
perceived certainty and perceived severity.
A final measurement issue concerns the propriety
of using self-reported past involvement in illegal
behavior as the dependent variable with present
perceptions of the threat of legal punishment as
the independent variable. The problem of causal
ordering with this strategy has been frequently
noted. Tittle has suggested that a respondent's
estimate of whether he will commit the offense in
" N. NAMBOODIRi, L. CARTER & H. BLALOCK, APPLIED
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS AND ExPERIMENTAL DESIGNS
(1975).
i2 Anderson, et al., supra note 7; Bailey & Lott, Crime,
Punishment, and Personality, 67 J. CRiM. L. & C. 99 (1976);
Cohen, supra note 4; Grasmick & Bryjak, supra note 10;
Teevan, Deterrence Effects of Punishment for Breaking and
Entering and Theft, in FEAR OF PUNISHMENT 122-149 (Law
Reform Commission of Canada 1976); Teevan, Deterrent
Effects of Punishment: Subjective Measures Continued, 18 CAN.
J. CRIMINOLOGY & CORRECTIONS 152 (1976).
the future might be a more appropriate measure of
the dependent variable.'3 Tittle, in fact, has used
such a measure in his own research. Of course, it is
impossible to measure future behavior directly
without the employment of some type of panel
design in which perceptions are measured at Time
1 and behavior is measured at Time 2. Implicit in
previous synchronic deterrence research is the as-
sumption that past illegal behavior is a reasonably
valid indicator of future illegal behavior. There is no
a priori reason to assume, as Tittle apparently does,
that respondents' present beliefs about what they
will do in the future is a more valid indicator than
is self-reported past behavior. Arguments for and
against each type of measure could be made.
Therefore, pending resolution of this issue, it is
necessary to use both measures and note any dis-
crepancies in the analysis.
II. THREAT OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT AND OTHER
INHIBITORY VARIABLES
Even as deterrence research first was being pub-
lished, some prominent sociologists were criticizing
the discipline for not focusing on force as a mech-
anism of social control. 14 Gibbs has reminded so-
ciologists that deterrence theory, like radical crim-
inology, constitutes an effort to bring the mecha-
nism of force into a more central position in the
study of social control.' 5 However, no commentator
writing from the deterrence perspective has sug-
gested that legal force is the sole mechanism of
control, or even that it is the most important
mechanism. Rather, what is emerging from deter-
rence research is a model of social control contain-
ing three inhibitory variables-internalization of
norms, threat of social disapproval, and threat of
legal punishment.
In his essay, Wrong observed that sociological
theories of social control attempting to explain
inhibition of illegal behavior have limited their
focus .to internalization and avoidance of social
disapproval.' 6 The emphasis on internalization de-
rives from the writings of Parsons 17 and ultimately
from those of Durkheim, especially The Elementary
Forms of the Religious Life s.' From this perspective,
13 Tittle, supra note 2.
14 Goode, Force in Human Society, 37 AMER. Soc. REV.
507 (1972); Janowitz, Sociological Theory and Social Control,
81 AM.J. Soc. 82 (1975).
is Gibbs, Social Control, Deterrence, and Perspectives on Social
Order, 56 Soc. FORCES 408 (1977).
16 Wrong, supra note 5.
:7 T. PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM (1951).
8 E. DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS
LIFE (1965).
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internalized social norms become "constitutive-
rather than merely regulative of human nature."
'1 9
Wrong also traces the second control mechanism,
the avoidance of social disapproval or stigma, to
Parsons as well as to Linton. Theoretical accept-
ance of this control mechanism necessitates viewing
man as "especially motivated by the desire to
achieve a positive image of self by winning accept-
ance or status in the eyes of others.,
20
Wrong did not deny the importance of internal-
ization and social disapproval in the social control
process; rather, he simply objected to sociology's
implicit denial that the quest for material and
physical rewards and the avoidance of material
and physical deprivation also are powerful motives
in human behavior. The core variable in deterrence
theory, threat of legal punishment, is the threat of
one form of physical and material deprivation. But
the other two factors-internalization and social
disapproval-have been incorporated into the de-
velopment of the deterrence perspective. Of the
twenty identified studies testing hypotheses about
individuals' perceptions of legal sanctions and their
involvement in illegal behavior, an overwhelming
majority include some measure of moral commit-
ment (internalization) or threat of social disap-
proval, and thus link deterrence theory to the other
major answers to the Hobbesian problem of order
in sociology.
2 1
Not surprisingly, several studies in the deterrence
literature report a strong zero-order inverse rela-
tionship between individuals' level of moral com-
mitment and their involvement in illegal behav-
ior.22 More interesting, however, is the "condi-
tional" hypothesis proposed by several writers that
the threat of legal punishment has a deterrent
effect only upon those individuals who are not
morally committed to the law.2 According to this
view, internalization is such a powerful inhibitor
that it precludes the possibility of an actor ever
'9 Wrong, supra note 5, at 186.
20 Wrong, supra note 5, at 185.
21 See, e.g., Jacob, Deterrent Effects of Formal and Informal
Sanctions, 2 L. & POL. Q. 61 (1980); Jensen, Erickson &
Gibbs, supra note 2; Meier & Johnson, supra note 7;
Silberman, supra note 7; Tittle, supra note 2; Tittle &
Rowe, Moral Appeal, Sanction, Threat, and Deviance: An
Experimental Test, 20 Soc. PRODS. 488 (1973); Waldo &
Chiricos, Perceived Penal Sanction and Self-Reported Criminal-
ity: A Neglected Approach to Deterrence Research, 19 Soc.
PRODS. 522 (1972).
2 See, e.g., Kraut, Deterrent and Definitional Influences on
Shoplifting, 23 Soc. PRODS. 358 (1976); Meier &Johnson,
supra note 7; Tittle, supra note 2, at 588-89.
3 See, e.g., J. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND DETER-
RENcE 80 (1975); F. ZIMRING, PERSPECTIVES ON DETER-
RENCE 44-45 (1971).
feeling the motivation to deviate. Individuals who
have internalized a norm will not violate it even if
they perceive legal punishment as unlikely or triv-
ial. Therefore, perceived threat of legal punishment
should be related to involvement in illegal behavior
only across individuals not morally committed to
the legal norm. The effects of moral commitment
and perceived threat of legal punishment on in-
volvement in illegal behavior are not additive;
rather, the magnitude of the effect of perceived
threat of legal punishment is contingent upon the
level of moral commitment.
Several years ago, Blake and Davis criticized the
argument that internalization "involves a blocking
out of deviant motives" as Parsons seemed to sug-
gest.24 Instead, they proposed that, in the presence
of deviant motivation, one inhibitor of deviant
behavior is moral commitment to the norm and
the accompanying threat of "feelings of guilt"
consequent to violation of the norms. Deviant mo-
tivation, however, might be so high that the actor
is willing to incur this cost in order to engage in
the deviant behavior. From this perspective, the
threat of legal punishment, one of the other inhib-
itory factors discussed by Blake and Davis, should
have a deterrent effect regardless of the level of
moral commitment. Whether an actor with deviant
motivation will violate an internalized legal norm
should depend on the actor's perception of the
threat of legal punishment. Thus, according to this
view, threat of legal punishment should have a
deterrent effect even among the morally commit-
ted.
Only two studies in the deterrence literature
directly address this issue, and the findings are
inconsistent. Silberman's data suggest that the de-
terrent effect of threats of legal punishment is
significantly greater when moral commitment is
low,25 but the evidence presented by Jensen sug-
gests that it does not vary significantly with the
level of moral commitment.2 Neither of these stud-
ies, however, used the measure of perceived threat
of legal punishment recommended above.
2 Blake & Davis, Norms, Values and Sanctions, in HAND-
BOOK OF MODERN SOCIOLOGY 456-84 (R. Fars ed. 1964).
25 Silberman, supra note 7; see also Grasmick & Mc-
laughlin, Deterrence and Social Control (Comment on Silber-
man, ASR June, 1976), 43 AM. Soc. Rev. 272 (1978);
Jensen, Erickson & Gibbs, supra note 2.
26 Elliot, Ageton & Canter, An Integrated Theoretical
Perspective on Delinquent Behavior, 16 J. RESEARCH CRIME
& DELINQUENCY 3 (1979). The link to Hirschi's theory per
se is not especially profound. However, Elliot et aL use
the concepts of "commitment" and "involvement" in
Hirschi's theory to refer to an individual's relationships
with deviant and nondeviant peers and the resulting
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The other inhibitory variable which has been
considered-the threat of social disapproval-pro-
vides a link between deterrence theory and Hir-
schi's control theory (especially as Elliot has inter-
preted the concepts of "involvement" and "com-
mitment"), 27 Sutherland's theory of differential as-
sociation, and the recent reformulation of Suther-
land's theory by Akers.2s A crucial variable in these
theories is whether a person's friends are involved
in illegal behavior. If an actor associates with peo-
ple who do not violate the law, then there is a high
threat of social disapproval for the actor if he
violates the law. On the other hand, if the actor's
friends do engage in illegal behavior, then the
threat of informal sanctions for law violations is
minimal. Several deterrence researchers report rel-
atively strong positive zero-order relationships be-
tween friends' involvement and respondent's in-
volvement in illegal behavior (or strong inverse
zero-order relationships between threat of social
disapproval and illegal behavior).29
Some writers have proposed that the threat of
legal punishment deters individuals from commit-
ting deviant behavior only where accompanied by
a substantial threat of social disappproval. 30 From
this perspective, the physical and material depri-
vation of legal sanctions is not a crucial factor in
the social control process. Rather, the real deterrent
function of legal punishment is the threat of being
exposed as an offender to one's peers who then
would impose informal sanctions. Therefore, if
there is no threat of these informal sanctions upon
exposure, the threat of legal punishment would be
an ineffective deterrent. According to this argu-
ment, only under the condition of a high threat of
social disapproval should perceived threat of legal
punishment be inversely related to involvement in
illegal behavior.
This conditional hypothesis appears rooted in
what Wrong criticized as sociology's "oversocial-
ized concept of men."31 Wrong argued that indi-
viduals are motivated by physical and material
rewards and costs as well as by approval and
sanctioning networks. Elliot et al. link Hirschi's other two
concepts, attachment and belief, to the concept of inter-
nalization as we have used it.
7 Wrong, supra note 5.
2 Akers, Krohn, Lanza-Kaduce & Radosevich, Social
Learning and Deviant Behavior: A Specific Test of a General
Theoy, 44 AM. Soc. REv. 635 (1979).
29See, e.g., Kraut, supra note 18; Tittle, supra note 2.
* See, e.g., Tittle & Logan, Sanctions and Deviance: Evi-
dence and Remaining Questions, 9 L. & Soc. REv. 371 (1973);
Zimring & Hawkins, The Legal Threat as an Instrument of
Social Change, 27J. Soc. IssuEs 33 (1971).
31 Wrong, supra note 5.
disapproval from their peers. Wrong's argument
suggests that perceived threat of legal punishment
and threat of social disapproval have additive ef-
fects on illegal behavior, and that therefore the
effect of the threat of legal punishment is not
contingent upon the level of threat of informal
sanctions. The five studies directly addressing this
issue overwhelmingly support the additive hypoth-
esis rather than the conditional hypothesis. a2 How-
ever, none of these tests used the recommended
measure bf perceived threat of legal punishment.
In summary, with the exception of Silberman's
findings regarding moral commitment as a condi-
tional variable in the relationship between per-
ceived threat of legal punishment and involvement
in illegal behavior, the cumulated research suggests
that the three inhibitory variables have additive
effects. In other words, each of the three mecha-
nisms of control outlined by Wrong makes an
independent, significant contribution to the expla-
nation of variation in individuals' involvement in
illegal behavior. The research described below tests
the conditional hypotheses again but with a new
measure of perceived threat of legal punishment.
An analysis of the explanatory power of the inhib-
itory model follows this presentation of research
and concludes by suggesting how the inhibitory
factors might be linked with motivational factors
in a more complete theory of the etiology of crime.
III. RESEARCH PROCEDURES
Data were gathered in a survey of a large met-
ropolitan community in the Southwest during the
spring of 1979. A simple random sample of 400
adults was drawn from the Polk City Directory.
Contacts to schedule appointments for interviews
were made either by phone or at the door, and
refusals were replaced by re-sampling. The replace-
ment process continued until the completion of 400
interviews. The analysis excludes ten respondents
who were interviewed but failed to answer all
items.ss
32 Anderson, Chiricos & Waldo, supra note 7; Burkett
& Jensen, Conventional Ties, Peer Influence, and the Fear of
Apprehension: A Study of Adolescent Marijuana Use, 16 Soc.Q. 522 (1975); Grasmick & Appleton, supra note 7; Jen-
sen, supra note 1; Silberman, supra note 7.
33 The sampling procedure generated a sample very
similar to the population of the community in selected
demographic characteristics from 1970 census data.
Eighty-five per cent of the sample, compared to 87% of
the population, are white. Fourty-four per cent of the
sample and 45% of the population are males. The median




A. INVOLVEMENT IN ILLEGAL BEHAVIOR
Information was gathered about respondents'
involvement in eight illegal activities: theft of prop-
erty worth less than $20, theft of property worth
$20 or more, gambling illegally, cheating on tax
returns, intentionally inflicting physical injury
(battery), littering, illegal use of fireworks within
the city limits, and driving while under the influ-
ence of alcohol. The first five offenses were drawn
from Tittle's research.34 For each of the eight of-
fenses, respondents were asked if they had commit-
ted the offense and whether they thought they
would commit the offense in the future. Respon-
dents recorded their answers to these questions on
a separate sheet and did not have to reveal them
to the interviewer. For both past-involvement and
estimated future-involvement, a code of 0 was as-
signed to "no," and a code of I was assigned to
"yes." Thus, the mean for an offense indicates the
proportion of the sample who have committed, or
think they will commit the offense. These means
and the corresponding variances are in the top two
panels of table 1.
B. PERCEIVED CERTAINTY OF ARREST
In accord with the argument presented earlier,
respondents were asked to "estimate the chanceyou
would be arrested by the police if you did each of
these things." The response options and their codes
for each offense are (1) definitely would not be, (2)
probably would not be, (3) probably would be,
and (4) definitely would be. The panel labeled
"Certainty" in table 1 contains the mean and
variance of this item for each offense.
C. PERCEIVED SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT
Perceived severity of punishment was optional-
ized as a respondent's assessment of the personal
cost of the penalty expected. Respondents were
instructed to "imagine you had been arrested and
found guilty and the court had decided what your
punishment would be." Then they were asked to
"think about what that punishment probably
would be for you," but were not asked to record
what they thought the sentence would be. Instead,
they were asked to "indicate how big a problem
that punishment would create for your life." The
response options and codes were (1) no problem at
all, (2) hardly any problem, (3) a little problem,
(4) a big problem, and (5) a very big problem.
Means and variances of this item for all eight
Tittle, supra note 2.
offenses are in the panel of table 1 labeled "Sever-
ity."
D. THREAT OF SOCIAL DISAPPROVAL
Threat of social disapproval, as in most previous
studies, was indexed by the extent of friends' illegal
behavior. Respondents were instructed to "think of
the five adults you know best." For each offense,
respondents were asked how many of the five they
thought had committed the offense. For later anal-
ysis, the scores have been inverted so that a low
score on the raw item indicates a high threat of
social disapproval. The means in the panel of table
1 entitled "Threat of Social Disapproval," there-
fore, are the number of the five closest acquaint-
ances who have not committed the offenses.
E. MORAL COMMITMENT TO THE LEGAL NORM
As in previous studies, moral commitment was
measured by the following item: "For each offense,
please tell me if you think it is (1) never wrong to
do it, (2) seldom wrong to do it, (3) sometimes
wrong to do it, (4) usually wrong to do it, or (5)
always wrong to do it." The bottom panel of table
1 contains the mean and variance of this item for
each offense.
F. SCALE CONSTRUCTION
Several previous researchers have tested deter-
rence hypotheses using composite scales rather
than, or in addition to, individual offenses. In other
words, scales for each type of judgment reflect the
aggregate of responses to the question for each of
the offenses. Silberman has provided a theoretical
rationale for preferring such an analysis. His ra-
tionale has the additional advantage of generating
variables which approximate an interval level of
measurement and which are analyzable with fa-
miliar multiple regression techniques.
35
To justify using composites in the present anal-
ysis, factor analysis was conducted for each set of
items to determine if they were unidimensional.
Application of the scree test described by Gorsuch
to the complete principal components solutions
showed that a one-factor model fits the correlation
matrix for each set of items.36 Thus, each item set
appears to be tapping a single dimension. Next, an
examination of the factor loadings on the first
principal factor for each set of items demonstrated
that loadings for all sets are above .35, and most
are in the range of .50 to .70. Each composite scale
3 Silberman, supra note 7, at 455.
6 R. GORSUCH, FACTOR ANALYSIS (1974).
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.231 .508 .249 .529 .259 .733 .690 .505
.178 .251 .187 .250 .192 .196 .215 .251
.082 .464 .313 .169 .149 .503 .464 .300
.075 .249 .216 .141 .127 .215 .249 .211
2.950 1.952 2.050 2.975
.687 .645 .587 .749
4.180 2.754 2.556 4.393
.923 1.375 1.621 .778
3.927 1.283 1.573 2.514
2.252 3.367 3.508 3.414
3.673 4.312 4.835 4.753 4.725 3.965 4.739
1.600 1.130 .203 .321 .454 1.364 .327
was then constructed by summing the z-score trans-
formation of the item for all eight offenses. Finally,
Cronbach's alpha was computed as an internal-
consistency measure of reliability for each scale.
The values of alpha are .82 for perceived certainty,
.88 for perceived severity, .83 for threat of social
disapproval, .78 for moral commitment, .73 for
self-reported past involvement in illegal behavior,
and .74 for estimated future involvement in illegal
behavior.
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0. THREAT OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT AS THE PRODUCT
OF CERTAINTY AND SEVERITY
Earlier discussion suggested that the threat of
legal punishment is a multiplicative function of its
perceived certainty and severity. If either of these
components is zero, perceived threat of legal pun-
ishment is zero. A previous article based on these
same data demonstrates the utility of this concep-
tualization of the core independent variable in
deterrence theory.
38
The scales of perceived certainty and perceived
severity were formed by summing z-score transfor-
mations of items. Thus, negative numbers reflect
the low scores and positive numbers reflect high
scores. Multiplying extremely low scores or ex-
3 The details of this sealing procedure are available
from the authors upon request.
m Grasmick & Bryjak, supra note 10.
tremely high scores for both variables, would result
in a high positive product. To avoid this problem,
the lowest score in the distribution was added to
each score on certainty and severity scales. This
procedure created adjusted scales with all positive
scores. The product of these adjusted scales mea-
sures perceived threat of legal punishment, and is
strongly related to both perceived certainty (r =
.83) and perceived severity (r = .74).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS
Table 2 reports bivariate correlations among all
scales to be used in the multivariate analyses. Each
of the three inhibitory variables correlates signifi-
cantly and in the expected direction with both
measures of involvement in illegal behavior. With
I, (self-reported past involvement) as the depen-
dent variable, the correlations with L (perceived
threat of legal punishment) and M (moral com-
mitment) are approximately equal (-.40 and
-. 42), and both are somewhat smaller than the
correlation of -. 59 between S (threat of social
disapproval) and I. With If (estimated future in-
volvement) as the dependent variable, the corre-
lations with S and M are approximately equal
(-.51 and -. 55), and both are somewhat larger
than the correlation of -. 34 between L and If.
Quetionnaire It.n
Theft, Illegal Tax Theft, Hurting
$20 or Hore Gaabling Cheating Less Than $20 Soeone
3.005 2.170 2.437 2.400







Although the inhibitory variables correlate sig-
nificantly with one another (r's of +.37, +.29 and
+.42), these bivariate relationships are not ex-
tremely strong. In general, the independent vari-
ables are more strongly correlated with the depen-
dent variables than they are with each other.
Therefore, the overall R 2 with all three inhibitory
variables as predictors of illegal behavior should be
greater than any individual r2 between an indepen-
dent and a dependent variable. Furthermore, the
strong correlation (r = +.74) between Ip and If, the
alternate measures of the dependent variable, sug-
gests that the general pattern of multivariate rela-
tionships will be similar for both measures.
B. CONDITIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
The two conditional hypotheses extracted from
previous writings are, first, that the inverse effect
of L on I, (or If) is greater when M is low than
when M is high and, second, that the inverse effect
of L on I, (or If) is smaller when S is low than when
S is high. Cohen and Cohen describe a procedure
for testing such hypotheses. 39 The procedure is
analogous to analysis of covariance but summarizes
all the information in a single regression equation.
The conditional variable (in this case, M or S) is
dichotomized and assigned scores of 0 and 1 to
indicate low and high values. Then, the dependent
variable is regressed on the quantitative variable
(in this case, L), on the dichotomy, and on the
product of the quantitative variable and dichot-
omy. This regression estimates the coefficients in
the equation Y' = a + bIX + b2D + b3XD, where
X is the quantitative independent variable and D
is the dichotomy. The coefficient bi is the slope of
the regression of Y on X for cases with scores of 0
on D since, when D = 0, Y' = a + biX (i.e., all
terms containing D drop out of the equation when
D = 0). On the other hand, when D = 1, then Y'
= (a + b2) + (b, + b3)X. Thus, when D = 1, the
slope of the regression of Y on X is b, + b3. If b3 is
significant, then the difference between these two
slopes (effects) is significant.
To use this procedure M and S were dichoto-
mized at their medians and the following regres-
sions were performed: I' = a + biL + b2MD +
b3LMD, and I' = a + biL + b2SD + b3LSD. The
hypothesis concerning moral commitment as a con-
ditional variable predicts that in the first equation
'J. COHEN AND P. COHEN, APPLIED MULTIPLE REGRES-
SION/CORRELATION ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL ScI-
ENCES 291-343 (1975).
bi will be negative and b3 will be positive. In this
case bi + b3 would be a smaller negative number
when M = 1 than when M = 0. If this is true and
if b3 is significant, then perceived threat of legal
punishment would have a greater deterrent (i.e.,
inverse) effect when moral commitment is low than
when moral commitment is high. The hypothesis
concerning threat of social disapproval predicts
that in the second equation b, will be negative and
b3 will be negative. Under this hypothesis, L would
have a larger inverse effect on involvement in
criminal behavior when S is high (b1 + b3) than
when S is low (b1).
Table 3 presents the results of this test of the
conditional hypotheses. For each hypothesis, I, and
If have been used as alternative measures of the
dependent variable.
The top two panels of the table contain the
results with moral commitment as the conditional
variable. With self-reported past involvement in
illegal behavior (I,) as the dependent variable, the
b of -0.0116 associated with L is the effect of
threat of legal punishment when moral commit-
ment is low (i.e., MD = 0). This b is significant
beyond the .001 level. (With the specified degrees
of freedom, an F of 10.83 is required for significance
at the .001 level). The sum of this b and the b of
+0.0046 associated with LMD is the effect of L on
Ip when moral commitment is high (i.e., MD = I).
This sum is -0.0070. Thus, as the conditional
hypothesis predicts, the magnitude of the inverse
effect of L on Ip is greater when moral commitment
is low than when moral commitment is high. How-
ever, the difference between the two slopes (i.e., the
b associated with LMD) is not significant at the .05
level. (An F of 3.84 is required for significance at
the .05 level). Therefore, the difference between
slopes must be attributed to chance. The same
conclusion is reached with If as the dependent
variable in the second panel of table 3. The b of
+0.0027 associated with LMD, although in the
direction predicted by the conditional hypothesis,
is not significant. Thus, the evidence suggests that
the deterrent effectiveness of perceived threat of
legal punishment is not contingent upon the level
of moral commitment.
The bottom two panels of table 3 contain the
test for threat of social disapproval as a conditional
variable. With Ip as the dependent variable, the b
associated with LSD is positive (+0.0042), contrary
to the hypothesis from previous writings, but is not
significant. Therefore, the deterrent effect of per-
ceived threat of legal punishment does not vary
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TABLE 2
BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS AMONG SCALES*
L S H I
L (158.4)
S +.37 (5.38)
M +.29 +.42 (4.90)
I -.40 -.59 -.42 (4.68)p
If -.34 -.51 -.55 +.71 (4.71)
* The diagonal entries are standard deviations, and the off-diagonals are Pearsonian
correlations. All correlations are significant beyond the .001 level. The scale abbrevi-
ations are: L = threat of legal punishment; S = threat of social disapproval; M =
moral commitment to legal norms; Ip = self-reported past involvement in illegal
behavior; If = estimated future involvement in illegal behavior.
TABLE 3
TESTs OF CONDITIONAL HYPOTHESES
Pependent Iidependente R2
Varinb1e V;ria:,ble Beta b F1,38 P Y-i tercep F3 , 3 86  P
L -.392 -0.0116 27.05 <.001
1 L -.468 -4.3728 25.72 <.001 +4.6298 .263 45.83 <.001
L 0  +.203 +0.0046 2.70 >.05
L -.258 -0,0077 12.14 <.001
If 1) -.513 -4.8340 31.97 <.001 +4.0874 .287 51.82 <.001
I"D  +.116 +0.0027 0.94 >.05
L -.377 -0.0111 27.18 <.001
I SD -.535 -5.0010 36.87 <.001 +4.8990 .319 60.39 <.001
LSD  +.183 +0.0042 2.53 >,05
L -.371 -0.0111 23.21 <.001
If SD  -.505 -4.7594 28.93 <.001 +4.4808 .227 37.89 <.001
LSD +.251 +0.0059 4.17 <.05
with the level of threat of social disapproval. The
results with If as the dependent variable, however,
are surprising. The b for LSD is +0.0059 and
significant at the .05 level. When S is low, the effect
of L on If is -0.0111 (i.e., the b associated with L);
but when S is high the effect of L on It is -0.0052
(i.e., -0.0111 plus +0.0059). This difference in
slopes is significant in a direction contrary to that
predicted in previous writings. Our data indicate
that, with estimated future involvement as the
dependent variable, perceived threat of legal pun-
ishment has a greater deterrent (inverse) effect
when threat of social disapproval is low than when
it is high.
This finding should not be overly emphasized
since the F of 4.17 associated with the difference
between slopes is only slightly larger than the F of
3.84 required for significance at the .05 level and
since no previous test of the conditional hypothesis
has yielded such a result. On the other hand, no
prior studies have used measures similar to L and
If, and the deterrence literature has offered a ra-
tionale for this unique finding. 0 Matza's discussion
of "drifters" suggests that an individual's having
4°Jensen, supra note 1, at 196.
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ties to people conforming to the law will produce
conformity by the individual. 41 Fearing social dis-
approval, these individuals will conform to the law
regardless of their perceptions of the threat of legal
punishment. Therefore, among individuals having
conventional ties and thus facing a high threat of
social disapproval, variation in perceived threat of
legal punishment should not produce variation in
conformity to the law. But when conventional ties
are absent or weak, then the threat of legal punish-
ment becomes a major deterrent to illegal behavior.
Consequently, among individuals in a situation of
low threat of social disapproval, variations in per-
ceptions of the threat of legal punishment should
produce variation in conformity to the law. This
argument is relatively weakly supported where If is
the dependent variable.
Thus, the evidence concerning the proposed in-
teraction effect of threat of legal punishment and
threat of social disapproval is mixed. Both I, and
If, the indicators of the future illegal behavior,
provide no support for the common argument that
threats of legal punishment deter only when the
threat of social disapproval is high. With one of the
indicators, If, there appears a slight tendency for
the threat of legal punishment to deter more effec-
tively when the threat of social disapproval is low.
This finding is not matched with Ip as the depen-
dent variable. In the absence of evidence concern-
ing the relative validities of the two indicators of
future illegal behavior, the status of this ex post facto
hypothesis derived from Matza is uncertain in the
presented data.
C. EXPLANATORY POWER OF THE INHIBITORY VARI-
ABLES
Table 4 describes the additive effects of the three
inhibitory variables on both Ip and If as measures
of the dependent variable. When comparing the
relative direct effects of two or more independent
variables in a single group of respondents, the
standardized regression coefficients (Betas) are the
appropriate statistics.
For both dependent variables, each of the three
independent variables has a significant direct ef-
fect. With Ip as the dependent variable, the direct
effects of L and M are approximately equal (-. 172
and -. 178), and both are noticeably smaller than
the direct effect of S (-.460). However, all three
Betas are significant at the .001 level. With If as
the dependent variable, the direct effects of M and
S are approximately equal (-.389 and -. 307), and
41 D. MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT (1964).
both are three times as large as the direct effect of
L (-.110). In fact, while the Betas for M and S are
significant at the .001 level, the Beta for L is
significant only at the .05 level. (However, the F of
6.55 is very near the value of 6.64 required for
significance at the .01 level).
By current standards in the area of criminology
and deviance research, the values of R 2 for the two
regressions are quite large. The simple additive
model containing only the three inhibitory vari-
ables yields R2's of .418 with I, as the dependent
variable and .407 with If as the dependent variable.
Considering the likelihood of attenuation attrib-
utable to random measurement error since the
reliability coefficients for the scales are less than
1.0, it appears that the model can explain close to
half the variance in involvement in illegal behav-
ior. The model admittedly is eclectic in drawing
upon a variety of theories and incomplete in in-
cluding only inhibitory variables. Nevertheless, it
can provide the basis for future development of a
more comprehensive theory of the etiology of crime
and deviance.
V. DISCUSSION
The three independent variables-moral com-
mitment, perceived threat of legal punishment and
threat of social disapproval-appear to constitute
a concise and probably exhaustive set of factors
which inhibit illegal behavior. Deterrence research-
ers have considered these variables over the past
decade, and the results of this study are basically
consistent with their findings. This study's contri-
bution is to incorporate all refinements in mea-
surement and all multivariate hypotheses into a
single piece of research.
Although even further refinements in measure-
ment are warranted, the next major step for re-
searchers interested in deterrence, or in the etiology
of crime and deviance in general, is to link these
inhibitory variables with the various theories con-
cerning motivational factors such as anomie, con-
formity to deviant subcultural norms, and blocked
opportunities.42 In the data presented, about 60
per cent of the variance in illegal behavior remains
unexplained by the set of three inhibitory variables.
Most of this variance is probably attributed to
variation in levels of motivation to violate the law
among the respondents in the sample. Many people
who scored low on measures of illegal behavior
42 Eve, A Study of the Efficacy and Interactions of Several
Theories for Explaining Rebelliousness Among High School Stu-
dents, 60J. CRIM. L. &C. 115 (1978).
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probably did so because they lacked the motivation
to violate the law. Inhibitory factors cannot explain
this portion of the variance in the dependent vari-
able. In the absence of motivation to engage in
illegal behavior, inhibitory factors should be irrel-
evant in the production of conformity to legal
norms. It is suggested, therefore, that the inhibitory
model presented here actually applies only to those
people who, for whatever reason, are ever-moti-
vated to commit illegal acts.
INHIBITORS OF ILLEGAL BEHAVIOR
TABLE4
ADDITIVE EFFECTS OF INHIBITORY VARIABLES ON INVOLVEMENT IN ILLEGAL BEHAVIOR
Dependent Independent R2
Variable Variable Beta F1,386 p R F3,386 p
L -.172 16.46 <.001
I N -.178 16.99 <.001 .418 92.50 <.001P
S -.460 106.29 <.001
L -.110 6.55 <.05
I f M -.389 79.43 <.001 .407 88.20 <.001
S -.307 46.43 <.001
